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Educational Justice: Equality vs. Adequacy
The debate on justice in education has long been focussed on the idea of equality.
Those who criticise education systems for being unjust often point to  inequalities
within   these   systems.   In   this   respect,   they   often   use   the   notion   of   equality   of
opportunity. In recent years, however, an alternative to equality­based conceptions of















distinguish different egalitarian views is  to ask what exactly  it   is  that should be
equalized; in short, educational equality of what? Possible answers are: Educational
resources,   quality,   opportunities,   or   outcomes.  A   second   question   is  whether  we
should aim at strict equality, or accept certain inequalities as legitimate.
For instance, we could opt for strict equality of resources (Brighouse 2002). This













able  and motivated students   from developing  their   full   capacities.  This,  however,
seems morally objectionable. A popular alternative to the ideal of equal outcomes is





















education   that  are  provided   to   them.  So,   certain   social   inequalities   in  education
cannot be overcome by merely opening up opportunities.
One of the most widely endorsed egalitarian principles of educational justice is the
so­called  meritocratic  principle   that   requires   equal   educational   opportunities   (or
‘prospects’) for those equally talented and willing (Brighouse/Swift 2008 and 2014). It
is related to Rawlsian fair equality of  opportunity,  according to which those with
equal   talents   and   an   equal  will   to   use   them   should  have   equal   chances   in   the
competition   for   social   positions.   Rawls’s   principle   –   just   like   the   corresponding
educational   conception   –   does   not   demand   strict   equality   (of   opportunity),   but
legitimizes   those   types   of   inequalities   that   are   thought   of   as   naturally   given




















natural  and  social   inequalities   seem  arbitrary   from a  moral  point   of   view,   since


















the  worst   off  makes   them  worse   off,   in  absolute  terms.   In   these   cases,  Rawls’s




Recall   that   the   meritocratic   principle   demands   we   provide   equal   educational
prospects for the equally talented.  It does not determine, however,  how groups of
equally talented persons should be treated compared to each other. In other words:
The meritocratic principle,  in  its current philosophical  formulations,  is compatible
with privileging the more talented – or with providing more resources for the less












that   these   accounts   do   not   demand   that   all   students   are   ‘adequately’   educated.
Equality can be established on a low educational level. This point can be related of
the   so­called  levelling­down   objection  against   egalitarian   accounts   of   distributive










plea   for   adequacy   is   related   to   a   general   critique   of   distributive   egalitarianism
(Anderson 2007;  see  also  Anderson 1999):   It  has  been claimed that  an equitable








Proponents  of   the  adequacy  view have   to   clarify,   then,  which   level  or   type  of
education is sufficient or adequate. Here, the crucial question is: Adequate for what?







general  social,  economic,  and political  conditions in a given society.  Access to the
labour market requires different sorts of capacities, in different economic settings. In
defining adequacy, we must not only set the right level of education, but also consider
educational  aims.   Being   adequately   educated  means   to   have   the   right   kind   of







access   to   the   labour  market.   So,   the   adequacy   view  must   entail   ‘comparative’
elements (Satz 2007). This is relevant because the sufficientarian account of justice is
usually presented as ‘non­comparative’.





but also the ability to  participate  in the democratic  process.   In addition,  persons
should     be autonomous with regards to their  personal   lives.  The adequacy view













comes   into   view,   again.   The   idea  might   be   that   persons   should   have   effective
opportunities to gain an adequate education.
The  main   objection   that   is   put   forward   against   the   adequacy   view   is   that
inequalities above a given threshold level can amount to serious forms of injustice.
This seems especially clear with regard to education in its ‘positional’ dimension: In
the   competition   for   social   rewards,   each  difference   in   the   level   of   education   can




adequacy   would   in   fact   be   realized   in   a   given   society.   Suddenly,   the   state
unexpectedly became able to  spend an additional  amount of  money on education.
How should this money be used? The objection against the adequacy view is that it is
indifferent   with   regards   to   this   question.   So,   the   additional   resources   could





expressed   in   one   single   principle   –   equality   or   adequacy.   Alternatively   to   this
‘monism’   of   principles,   ‘pluralistic’   conceptions   of   educational   justice   might   be
considered.   Indeed,   educational   egalitarians   have   pointed   out   that   an   adequacy
principle might as well  be included in their account (Brighouse/Swift 2014).  They
agree that a just education system must ensure both adequacy and equality. Their
critique   of   the  adequacy  view  amounts   to   the   claim,   then,   that   adequacy   is  not
enough.
Defenders   of   the   adequacy   view   might   address   this   critique   by   including
egalitarian principles into their account. If it is acknowledged that a conception of
adequacy   must   contain   comparative   elements,   some   sort   of   egalitarianism   has
already taken root within the adequacy view. It should also be noted that current
accounts of adequacy also entail versions of Rawls’s difference principle.
Building egalitarian  ideas   into   the  adequacy  view seems most  urgent  when  it
comes to the problem of fair competition for social awards. One way to reconcile the
8
two principles is to say that they refer to different functions of the education system
in the liberal democratic state: One of its functions is to enable persons to participate
economically and politically in the life of the community. For this purpose, it seems
appropriate to set up a threshold of basic education. Another function is, however, to
ensure fair social competition. Regarding this function, egalitarian principles seem
appropriate.
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